We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system since the 1990s . Following Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2001), we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large st shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of b eing tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these "entrenched banks" extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans .
Introduction
Japan's current banking problems , which are thought to be closely related to the economic downturn in Japan, began in the early 1990s and ha ve festered and worsened throughout the 1990s (see for example Hoshi and Kashyap 1999; Kashyap 2002) . This long duration and serious negative impact to the economy make it unique to Japan. Using a similar definition to that of the U.S., the NPLs for all banks were about ¥30 trillion in 1998-2000, which accounts about 5-6 percent of GDP (Table 1) when five banks failed. Among them was a nationwide city bank, the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, which was the first major bank to shut its doors since the end of the World War II. By this time , the problem in the financial sector became so acute that it endangered the viability of the entire financial system. A huge amount of funds including public funds ha s been used to cope with the banking problems. Since March 1998, the government has spent about ¥10 trillion. Another ¥20 trillion was also used by the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) at the end of March 2001.
An abundant literature explores the causes of the banking crisis. There are at least four competing views. First, the accumulation of bad loans was due to the collapse of the asset price bubble due to macroeconomic policy mistakes (Takeda and Turner 1992; Hamada 1995) . Second, the crisis was due to failure to create an eff ective system of banking regulation and supervision and safety net framework before adopting financial deregulation 1 The information on NPLs is not available before 1998. Japanese financial institutions began to disclose comprehensively defined NPLs for the first time in March 1998. (Ito 1999; Patrick 1999; Milhaupt; Nakaso 2001; Hoshi 2002) . Third, financial deregulation made good client firms shy away. Banks , therefore, turned to riskier industries in particular the real estate industry, and hence ended up with a huge amount of bad loans (Hoshi and Kashyap 1999) . Fourth, a weak corporate governance mechanism is responsible for excessive risk taking by bank management (Horiuchi and Hanazaki (2001 , 2003b , and 2003b ).
This paper investigates the argument of Horiuchi and Hanazaki . Specifically, we argue that the competitive -restricting regulation regime implemented since the WWII through 1990s had created moral hazard problems in the banking sector. As banks were ensured that they faced little competition and would n ot let fail, their management had incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking activities. The moral hazard problems could have been controlled by either financial regulators or d epositor s. Unfortunately, financial regulators are not reliable monitors due to the principle-agency problem (Kane 1995) .
Besides, they were incompetent because they could not obtain the necessary information to verify banks' loan portfolios. This is due to the common practice in Japan in which the main banks bail out their client firms. The loan portfolios could be perfectly substantiated, if the information on whether or not the financially distress ed firms to be bailed out could recover was know n ex ante. Likewise, depositor s are less likely to be tough monitor s because they have been provided a blanket guarantee.
Perhaps, the only potential monitors in the Japanese banking system are large shareholders (see also Dinc 2003) . In this paper, we investigate whether large shareholders are active or passive monitors. To identify the identity of large shareholders, we cons truct a unique dataset of bank ownership . Our focus is in particular the top three whom we believe own enough shares to have sufficient incentives to exert control. Our sample covers all banks for the period of 1980-2000. We find that insur ers predominate as the top three shareholders of larger national wide city banks. As for smaller regional banks, their top three shareholders are dominated by i nsurers and national wide banks. Amazingly, the ownership structure has been stable over a long period of time. The ranking of the largest shareholders as well as the percentage of shareholdings have been stable for the 20 years of our sample period. To our knowledge, we are the first who investigate this issue empirically.
We argue that the largest shareholders (insurers and banks) are passive in disciplining bank management for the following reasons. First, both insur ers and banks themselves appear to h ave weak corporate governance. As for insurers, there exists no control by shareholders as most of them are mutual companies owned by dispersed policyholders. The re also exists no substitute mechanism e.g., the market competition, in both banking and insurance industries to force the management to be efficient (Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2001) . Second, the monitoring incentives are worsen by the fact that insurers appear to receive some financial benefits from being non hostile to banks. These be nefits are the opportunities to walk in to bank offices to sell insurance policies to the bank employees, which seem to be huge transactions.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that the management of banks with insurers and banks among the top three shareholders is likely to be entrenched, and hence perform poor er than other banks . Our results show that during the 1980s when the economy was booming the entrenched banks tend to overlend. The incentives to extend lending are probably attributable to the promotion system that was closely tied to the amount of loans officers were able to lend. During the economic downturn in the 1990s, however, entrenched managers did not terminate lending and did not dramatically undertake restructur ings. These results support our argument that large shareholders were passive in governance of banks in Japan.
Along with other ongoing literature, our results highlight one important issue in corporate governance that the identity of large shareholders does matter. More precisely, when the largest shareholders are in the financial sector , in particular insurance and banking, they appear to be not tough. Our findings are in line with Morck et al. (2000) who investigate the role of l arge shareholder activism in Japanese firms. They document that bank ownership is negatively related to firm value. In contrast, corporate shareholders appear to be tougher as monitors and are beneficial to the firms (Morck et al. 2000; Yafeh and Yosha 2003) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the institutional backgrounds. In Section 3 we present the unique ownership structure of banks and develop testable hypotheses. Section 4 reports the main resul ts. Section 5 concludes.
The Institutional Background: A Review of Governance Structure of Banks in

Japan
In this section, we discuss the regulatory environment that creates incentives for bank managers to engage in high risk lending practices. In addition, we show that the corporate governance structure of banks is weak. None of the mechanisms that are supposed to curtail the moral hazard problems appear to be effective. We argue that these institutional frameworks provide autonomy to bank management.
The Comprehensive Safety Net System
The banking system during the post-war period and until the mid of the 1990s was operated under the competition-restricting regulation environment and the status quo was protected under the so-called "convoy system" (Patrick 1999; Spiegel 1999; Hoshi 2002; Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2003a among others) . Under this system , banks were ensured that de facto there would be no competition, and they would grow roughly at the same rate. This was achieved via regulatory measures such as controlling interest rates, fees and financial products, dividing business lines and branch restrictions , and restriction on new entry to the banking and financial business (Hamada and Horiuchi 1986; Hoshi 2002; Van Rixtel 2002) .
In addition, an extensive safety net was established to prevent bank failures. Under this approach, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) arranged for stronger banks to absorb insolvent banks by assuming the liabilities and assets of the insolvent banks (Hoshi 2002) . In some cases, the MOF placed its officials on the board of the failing bank to signal its commitment of not allowing the bank to fail. At other times, the Bank of Japan injected special loans to trouble banks to prevent systematic bank failures (Hanazaki and Horiuchi
2002).
In effect, the comprehensive safety net that ensures no failure had created acute moral hazard problems (Kane 1993; Patrick 1999; Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2003a) . In addition, the absence of competition implies that there exists no force to discourage bank management from fraudulent activities (see Allen and Gale 2000) . The "no failure policy," however, was de facto terminated around the first half of the 1990s (Nakaso 2001; Hoshi 2002; Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2003) . Some trouble d banks ended up being allowed to fail.
The conventional safety net was replaced by a deposit insurance system that was developed to be more comprehensive (Milhaupt 1999; Nakaso 2001) . Even though one city ba nk, the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank w as allowed to fail in 1997, it still appears that the current policy follows the too-big-to-fail policy (Van Rixtel et al. 2003) . In principle, the too-big-to-fail policy creates the moral hazard problems in a similar manner to the no failure policy.
Depositors as (Passive) Monitors
Depositors' position has been secured via the deposit insurance system that was formally established in 1971. The system ha s been equipped with a means of paying off insured deposits up to a prescribed limit for each depositor of a failed bank. However, de facto the MOF had provided a blanket guarantee , which was formally made official in 1996 ((Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2001; 2003a) . As widely recognized, the presence of a blanket guarantee removes any incentive that insured depositors and creditors have to control bank management (Merton 1977; Keeley 1990) . Their funds are fully protected regardless of the outcomes of the investment strategies that the management chooses. Ideally, under a regulated financia l system, the financial authority could act as monitors who conduct the monitoring necessary to prevent the management from fraud and self -dealing (see Black et al. 1978; Dewatripont and Tirole 1994) . However, as contended by Kane (1995) , regulators may not be credible monitor s because of the principal-agent problem between regulators, banks, and taxpayers.
In the Japanese context, Hanazaki and Horiuchi ( 2003a and 2003b) argue that regulator y monitoring in Japan ha d never been effective for the following two reasons. First, the financial authority face d little pressure from taxpayers because not only they are not well informed, but also have less incentive to monitor. Not until March 1998 when public funds of almost ¥2 trillion were used for the first time to rescue financially distressed financial institutions did taxpayers seem to fully realize that they ha d been bearing the costs of all the bail-outs.
Second, the regulators were not competent because they did not have inspection expertise. This seems to be one of the reasons why the MOF, who had been responsible for overseeing bank management for decades, was replaced by a new regulatory agency, the Financial Supervisory Agency, in June 1998. In addition, the financial regulators do not have precise information of banks' loan portfolios which is very crucial for making a precise assess ment of the soundness of a bank's management. The opacity of the loan portfolios is mainly due to the common practice of bailing out financially distressed client firms by the main banks. If the emerging rate of the bailed out firms from a financial distress were known ex ante, one could perfectly obtain the precise figures of NPLs and hence could verify the information on Japanese bank loan portfolios.
We are also skeptical about the argument that banks were disciplined via the amakudari system. (Aoki et al. 1994) This system is a practice of having high ranked retired officers of the Bank of Japan and MOF on the bank management team. In fact, Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) and Van Rixtel (2002) find that banks with amakudari have lower capital adequacy ratio and higher NPLs. They conclude that it is a sort of collusion between banks and officials. By adopting a policy of forbearance towards them, the regulators receive job opportunities for retired officials in return.
4 Large Shareholders
Perhaps the only potential monitor s who have the incentive to discipline bank management are large shareholders as they own sizable shares, and hence would bear the bankruptcy risk (Demsetz 1983 (Demsetz , 1986 Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . To investigate whether large shareholders are indeed potential effective monitors, one needs to understand the structure of ownership and control of banks. Unlike non-financial corporations on which extensive research exists, we know very little about ownership and control of banks in Japan.
Ownership and Control of Japanese Banks
In this section, we identify the largest shareholders and the degree of ownership concentration. This information is crucial in determining the degree of large shareholder activism, their objectives and skills in disciplining bank managers (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Barclay and Holderness 1989; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001) .
Sample and Data Sources
Our sample consists of all listed banks in Japan which are classified in the following categories: nationwide "city" banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, regional banks and second tier regional banks. The period of study is 1980-2000 which represent both pre and post bubble periods. As there were mergers and bank failures during this period, this panel data is unbalanced over the years. The sample includes 93-118 banks.
We manually collected the ownership data from a rich data source , the yukashoken hokokusho ( company annual report), which is published in Japanese annually by the Ministry of Finance. The ownership data includes the information on the top ten shareholders as of the end of a fiscal year which is March. We also collect the financial data from the same data source. twice the degree of concentration for banks (see also Prowse 1992 ). We will discuss some explanations to this phenomenon after identifying who are the largest shareholders. Table 3 highlights interesting stylized facts on the identity of the top three shareholders. The choice of the cut -off at the top three is due to the monitoring incentive argument (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . We think that the top three shareholders own enough shares to have sufficient incentives to exert corporate governance (see Table 2 ). The equity holdings by the forth and fifth largest shareholder, however, are too small. They own less than three percent of outstanding shares. Conversely, the top three shareholders can also be detrimental to the bank value if they enable bank managers to become entrenched.
We find that insurers, in particular, life insurers and banks , dominate the top three Corporation has been its largest shareholder), and the Daiwa Bank (in which the Osaka Gas Enterprise had been its largest shareholder until the end of the 1980s, and later on Nomura Securities took the place).
We also find that the ownership structure is very stable in such a way that with two exceptions all the nationwide city banks have the same investor as their largest shareholder.
The two exceptions are the Daiwa Bank and the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. In the Daiwa Bank, the largest shareholder changed once around the end of the 1980s . In the case of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the ownership structure changed significantly mainly due to financial distress around the mid of the 1990s befor e the bank went bankrupt.
Another interesting finding is that in many city banks the same insur ers have taken positions as the largest, second largest, and third largest shareholders over the 20 years under our investigation. Out of the total 13 city banks, the bank that had the most stable ownership structure is the Sanwa Bank. Amazingly, the ranking of its top three largest shareholders remained the same over 1980-1998 before it merged with the Tokai Bank and the Toyo Trust and Banking Corporation to become the UFJ Bank in April 2001. In three banks, the ranking of the top three shareholders was not changed at all until the mergers occurred. Among them is the Bank of Tokyo. In five banks, the ranking of the top three had remained stable until the mid of the 1990s when the banking crisis occurred. The financial distress is probably responsible for the change s in the ownership structure.
In regional banks and second tier regional banks , however, insurers are relatively It is important to note that the relatively low concentrated shareholdings in banks are probably due to the regulatory environment. Until 1987, the anti-monopoly regulations restricted shareholdings by a single bank as well as insurers to no more than 10 percent of a single firm. For banks, the limit has since been lower to 5 percent.
In summary, insurance companies and banks dominate the top three shareholder positions of banks . The ownership structure is unique in that the shareholdings are quite stable The ranking of the largest shareholders and their shareholdings have remained more or less the same for at least two decades.
3.3 Large Shareholder: Active or Silent?
The stable ownership structure implies that banks might have established close relationships with their largest shareholders. As information asymmetries are likely to be mitigated by having such close ties, the largest shareholders could be effective monitors.
However, we are skeptical about such arguments. In our view, both insurers and banks are not trustworthy as monitors for they have weak corporate governance hence have plenty of slack to pursue non value-maximizing policies. Komiya (1994) goes so far as to suggest that the management maximizes the wealth of the current employees. In addition, insures appear to lack of monitoring incentives and perhaps lack of monitoring expertise as well.
Similar to the banking industry, the insurance industry had been regulated (see Company. In effect, the market pressure did not exist to force insurers to be efficient. More importantly, like banks, no insurance companies were allowed to go bankrupt. Hence, like the banking industry, the moral hazard problems were created by regulations , and were not efficiently constrained by the financial authority.
In addition, weak corporate governance is contributable to the equity and debt structures. Regarding the equity structure, almost all of the insurers, and in particular life held by the banks' employees vanished (see Komiya 1994) . Given that the size of banks is relatively large, this transaction should be substantial. However, as insurers are not listed companies, there is no statistic evidence showing how valuable this transaction is. We think that these transactions may be more worthwhile to insurers than the capital gains and dividends received as shareholders. These benefits could be so large that they might cancel out the monitoring incentive (see also Komiya 1994; Fukao 2001 ).
In addition, insurance companies turned out to rely on banks for funding since they have been in financial troubles starting around the latter half of the 1990s. Fukao (2001) shows that as of March 2000, banks provided about ¥2.3 trillion of subordinated credit and surplus notes to life-insurance companies. Life-insurance companies in turn provided ¥6.7 trillion of subordinated credit to banks while also holding another ¥7.7 trillion of banks stocks.
The following incidence is consistent with our argument that insurers were not tough on the management. Around the end of the 1980s immediately after the BIS capital adequacy regulation came into effect, many banks could not meet the standard and needed to increase the ir capitals. Instead of being tough on poorly performing banks, insurers rescue d them by buying their subordinate debts. These measures were directed by the government,
however (see Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2003a ).
Similarly, we also argue that nationwide banks might not be active monitors who discipline the (regional or smaller) banks in which they own large equity positions. It also appears that implicit agreements exist in the banking industry that they would not interfere with each other management. Our argument is also consistent with the findings of Morck et al. (2000) that the equity ownership by banks is negatively related to performance of non-financial firms they own.
Following the literature, we argue that weak corporate governance affects managerial risk taking behavior positively (Saunders et al. 1990; Gorton and Rosen 1995; Knopf and Teall 1996; Anderson and Campbell 2000) . Accordingly, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Management of banks in which insurers and banks appear among the three largest shareholders is entrenched, and hence the banks perform poor er than other banks.
Further, we argue that lending strategies employed by the entrenched managers are dependent on economic conditions. During good times when banks have abundant resources, entrenched managers are likely to extend loans aggressively as well as make investments that are beneficial to managers themselves (Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Jensen 1993; Dinc 2003) . In the Japanese bank context, the incentives of increasing loans are partly attributable to the promotion system. For loan officers, until recently, the performance evaluation was based on the ability to extend lending, not on the loan performance. The amount of lending was crucial in particular to senior officers who aim to be promoted to the top executive level, which is the highest achievement in their career. To achieve this, senior officers have to gain support not only from the incumbent top executives but also from their junior colleagues.
Favor s to junior colleagues could be done by establishing new branches so that their junior colleagues could also have the chances of getting promotion to become branch heads. To create a demand for new branches, they had to extend more loans.
However, when investment opportunitie s deteriorate d during bad times , entrenched managers are likely to make poor decisions regarding investment and restruc turing (Gorton and Rosen 1995; Boot 1992)). In fact, incumbent managers during the 1990s appear to play the wait-and-see game hoping that bad loans would be recovered when the economy picked up. The intention was probably to avoid taking the responsibilities since the disposition of bad loans was likely to reduce the capital bases substantially to below the BIS standard. In contrast to other OECD countries, Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003b) fin d that Japanese banks did not significantly reduce employment, staff costs, and branches during the first half of the 1990s even though they had performed poorly. We argue that incumbent managers were able to delay taking drastic restructuring policies because there was not much pressure from large shareholders. Accordingly, our next testable hypotheses are as follow. 
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we test the hypotheses discussed in Section 3. First we examine whether the top three largest shareholders allows managers of the banks they own to become entrenched. Then, we check whether entrenched managers take different strategies regarding lending.
Performance of Entrenched Banks
Following the literature, we use four alternative measures of performance: the ratio of ordinary income (income before tax and before extraordinary gains and losses) to total assets (ROA), the pretax returns on equity (ROE), the BIS ratio of net worth to total assets (capital -adequacy ratio) , and the ratio of NPLs to total loans outstanding (NPL ratio). The capital-adequacy ratio and the NPL ratio also indicate the level of risk taking. Higher capital-adequacy ratio implies lower risk taking and hence better performance. In contrast, a higher NPL ratio implies higher risk taking and poorer performance. Furthermore, we find that the entrenched banks appear to take higher risk than non-entrenched b anks using the two measures of risk and hence performance. The entrenched banks have lower capital-adequacy ratio than the non-entrenched banks , as well as have higher NPL ratio for both periods. The difference, however, is significant only in the case of the combination of the capital-adequacy ratio and the period of 1980-1991. In any case, the results imply that entrenched banks took excessive risk, in particular during the good times.
Entrenche d Banks and Lending Behavior
In this Section, we draw the regression models to be used to analyze lending patterns of the entrenched banks against non-entrenched banks. Specifically, we test whether entrenched banks lend aggressively during good times, and still continue extend lending even during bad times when lending opportunities are rare and hence were supposed to cutoff loans. To assess this issue, we estimate the percentage change in total loan outstanding (Loans) on a dummy variable representing entrenched banks (Entrenched Banks) and other control variables.
A number of control variables are included in the model to control for the characteristics of banks as well as the state of the economy. First, we control for the characteristics of their client firms, in particular real estate firms. The lending to the real estate industry is regarded as one of the major industries which received huge loans during the bubble periods. A substantial part of these loans turned out to be non-performing in the 1990s. To capture this effect, we include the percentage change in the ratio of lending to the real estate industry to total loan outstanding (Rea l Estate Loans). Second, we also control for profitability using the ratio of ordinary income (income before tax and before extraordinary gains and losses) to total assets ( ROA). As profitability increases a bank's cash flow , it improves the lending capacity.
Third, we include three dummy variables to control for the effects of types of banks.
These dummies are nationwide city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. The benchmark banks hence are regional banks and second tier regional banks that operate locally. In other words, these three dummies capture the size and business line effects (see Hoshi and Patrick 1999) .
Forth, we control for the business cycle effects by including real annual GDP growth rate at the 1995 price (GDP). Finally, to control for the land price bubble effects we include the percentage changes in land price indices for city areas (Land Prices). Also, note that the lending practices of banks in Japan appear to be not project evaluation based, but to a large extent based on the assessment of land collateral. This variable captures the land collateral effect as well.
Specifically, the loan equation can be elaborated as follow.
( where the subscripts i and t indicate bank i and time t, respectively.
To address the potential endogeneity effect that profitability and lending may be simultaneously determined, we estimate a simultaneous equation system of loans and performance. The profitability equation is specified as follows. where Branch es and Employees are the percentage change in the number of branches, and the number of employees, respectively. Staff Costs are the percentage change in the sum of wages and salaries over total operation expenses.
The summary statistics of all the variables in the two equations are shown in Table 4 .
We run the simultaneous equations of the two models using the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation method with random effects. In the first stage, the profitability model (equation (2)) is regressed to obtain the fitted values. In the second stage, we use the fitted value of profitability as the instrumental variable of the profitability, and then run a regression of equation (1).
The regression results of the 2SLS estimation are presented in Table 6 . Finally, we find that the growth rate of the economy (GDP) affects loans negatively during good and bad times. We do not have good explanation for this finding, however.
Discussion: Keiretsu Relationships and Japanese Banks
We are aware that the ties among keiretsu firms are important in Japan. However, we believe that the keiretsu issues are not relevant as far as banks are concerned as there is no cross ownership tie between their largest shareholders and the banks. In other words, the cross-shareholdings that are prevalent in many keiretsu firms do not exist in the top shareholder level . As show in Section 3, similar to other banks, the top three shareholders of the so-called keiretsu banks, which are among the city banks, apparently had also been insurers. Among these insurers , one of them has always been the insurer who is affiliated to a keiretsu in which the bank belongs to. Note that this keiretsu membership is defined according to their membership of the six keiretsu presidential clubs. Howeve r, since the major insur ers are mutual companies, they are not tied to any of the keiretsu firms in the same group via ownership. So, compared to business groups in emerging economies, the ties between keiretsu firms are much looser (Khanna and Yafeh 2002) . Family does not appear as ultimate controlling shareholder. In addition, there is no centralized decision making mechanism. Accordingly, we also doubt that the interests of the insurers are aligned with those of the banks they own shares simply because they are affiliated to the same group and join the same presidential club.
Conclusion
Our analysis supports the argument of Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2002 and that in the banking industry, large shareholders do not play a role in monitoring managers. The large shareholders who apparently are banks and insurance companies turn out to collude or conspire with management. Consequently, the management might become entrenched as they are shielded from being monitored by outsiders. Our empirical results indeed show that during the 1980s these "entrenched banks" extended more lending, and after the collapse of the bubble they did not dramatically cut off the loans to cope with the accumulated non-performing loans.
An extension may be done by examining other restructurings including downsizing, employee layoffs, and salary cut s. In addition, it may be worthwhile to investigate whether the financial authority has bee active in monitoring bank managers. This table shows the univariate tests of mean performance of the two groups of banks classified according to the ownership structure. Entrenched banks are banks in which all the top three largest shareholders are insurance companies and banks. Otherwise, they are non entrenched banks. ROA is the ratio of ordinary income (income before tax and before extraordinary gains and losses) to total assets. ROE is the pretax returns on equity. Capital-adequacy ratio is the BIS ratio of net worth to total assets. The NPL ratio is the ratio of NPLs to total loans. Mean differences are tested using the t -test. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Loans is the percentage change in total loan outstanding. ROA is the ratio of ordinary income (income before tax and before extraordinary gains and losses) to total assets. Real Estate Loans is the percentage changes in the ratio of lending to the real estate industry to total loan outstanding. GDP is real annual GDP growth rate at the 1995 price. Land Prices is the percentage change in land price indices for city areas. Branches and Emplo yees are the percentage change in the number of branches, and the number of employees, respectively. Staff Costs are the percentage change in the sum of wages and salaries over total operation expenses. 1981-1991 1992-2000 1981-1991 1992-2000 1981-1991 1992-2000 1981-1991 1992-2000 1981-1991 1992-2000 Loans in which all the top three shareholders are only insurers and banks. ROA is the ratio of ordinary income (income before tax and before extraordinary gains and losses) to total assets. Real Estate Loans is the percentage changes in the ratio of lending to the rea l estate industry to total loan outstanding. GDP is real annual GDP growth rate at the 1995 price. Land Prices is the percentage change in land price indices for city areas. City Banks, Long Term Credit Banks, and Trust Banks are dummy variables indicating city banks, long term credit banks, and trust banks, respectively. Figures in the parentheses are standard deviations. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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